Lower ratios are generally insufficient to pacify hostile populations. Senior policymakers often press for clear answers, and replying with it depends, or I dont know can feel like failure, but its important for leaders to have a clear sense of the uncertainty they face. Few analysts, however, could combine these areas of expertise to represent Russian or Chinese leadership in a crisis simulation or a wargame.
While the war in Ukraine is likely far from over, this analysis comes to several initial conclusions. CIA analysts focus on national leaders, while the Defense Intelligence Agency and military service analysts examine military leadership: both key individuals and the leadership cultures of adversary forces. But winning back territory will be difficult for Ukraine. Microsoft worked closely with the Ukrainian government and cybersecurity staff from other governments and private companies to identify and remediate Russian threat activity against Ukrainian networks before and after the Russian invasion.52 In January 2022, the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center identified wiper malware in over a dozen Ukrainian networks and alerted the Ukrainian government.53 Microsoft established a secure line of communication with Ukrainian cyber officials to provide real-time threat information and offer technical support to assist Ukrainian efforts to identify and defeat Russian-linked cyberattacks over the course of the war.54 Microsoft worked with Ukrainian government officials to enable controlled folder access, a Microsoft Defender feature, and helped Ukraine run endpoint detection and response solutions.55. Russias goal was likely to undermine Ukraines political will, weaken Ukraines ability to fight, and collect intelligence that Russia could use to gain tactical, operational, and strategic advantages. This meant that one of Russias primary ways to strike deep into Ukraine was through cruise missiles launched from Russia, Belarus, and maritime vessels in the Black Sea. Chris Dougherty is a senior fellow in the Defense Program and co-lead of the Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security. And yet, like Russian forces prior to their invasion of Ukraine, the performance of the Peoples Liberation Army remains a massive unknowable factor. In addition, Russian forces encountered numerous command and control problems, including a paucity of secure communications, which undermined their ability to synchronize and coordinate attacks. comprehensive analysis every weekday . Western analysis has long questioned the quality of Russian leadership, especially at the junior level. Nevertheless, Western analysts clearly overestimated Russias armed forces, which have demonstrated critical flaws and vulnerabilities. Russian-linked hackers used a range of common intrusion techniques, such as exploiting public-facing web-based applications, sending spear phishing e-mails with attachments or links, and stealing credentials and using valid e-mail accounts. For the Kremlin, the status quo is likely to be unacceptable. First, these issues are intangible and difficult to assess without firsthand knowledge. Cyber and Space Challenges: Russia conducted multiple cyber operations, including cyberattacks and espionage operations, in concert with Russian land, air, and maritime attacks. . The historian Philipps Payson OBrien, for example, wrote an article for The Atlantic early in the war comparing the Western failure to grasp Russian weakness to misguided assessments of French vulnerabilities prior to its defeat by Germany in 1940. Russian cyber and electronic warfare capabilities have largely been neutralized by effective Ukrainian countermeasures, with help from Western state and non-state entities. Examples include UAVs with a longer range and higher payload than the Bayraktar TB2 or AeroVironment Switchblade loitering munition, such as the MQ-1C Gray Eagle; main battle tanks, such as the Leopard 2 heavy battle tank; medium- and long-range missile systems, such as the HIMARS multiple-launch rocket system; and fighter aircraft, such asSu-25s. It is critical to understanding military effectiveness and predicting military performance. During a wargame several years ago, Massicot presciently cited command and control and logistics as factors that would limit Russias ability to execute complex operations against NATO.
This analysis examines lessons from Russian air, ground, cyber, and other domains following Moscows February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Warfare is an incredibly complex endeavor and boiling it down into a prediction through simplistic analysis has the accuracy of a stopped clock: occasionally right, but mostly wrong. While the structure of BTGs varies somewhat based on operational needs and available personnel, most include roughly 600 to 800 soldiersand, in Ukraine, perhaps closer to 600 soldiers. Over the previous few years, Russia had invested heavily in electronic warfare systems capable of shutting down communications and signals across a broad spectrum. Second, morale is dynamic and contingent the motivated Finnish forces that imposed heavy casualties on the Red Army during the Winter War, for example, became the cynical veterans of the Continuation War in Vin Linnas classic novel Unknown Soldiers. Russias failures will force the Russian military to fundamentally rethink its training practices, organizational structure, culture, logistics, recruitment and retention policies, and planning efforts.
Over the next several weeks, Russian actors linked to the GRU, Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and Federal Security Service (FSB) conducted numerous cyberattacks utilizing such malware families as: These types of malware are designed to do a range of malicious activities, such as overwriting data and rendering machines unbootable, deleting data, and destroyingor attempting to destroycritical infrastructure, such as industrial production and processes. Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness. Most of these systems will require additional training and a steady supply of munitions and spare parts, which should be feasible with a protracted war. Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2 UAVs apparently sank the patrol boats and landing craft.46. But controlling territory in a foreign country with a hostile Ukrainian population was deeply problematic for the Russian military, particularly since the conflict began to resemble a peoples war.3 In addition, Russian forces failed to effectively integrate combined arms to seize and hold Ukrainian territory, including coordination between land power, air power, and long-range fires. Likewise, these personnel challenges and persistent issues like hazing raise questions about Russian morale. . The obvious temptation is to discount the potential performance of Russian forces. In the early phases of the war, Russia aimed to pin down Ukrainian air defenses around the country by conducting ballistic and cruise missile strikes across the country, including Kh-101 cruise missiles deployed from Tu-95 Bear and Tu-160 Blackjack bombers flying in Russian and Belarusian airspace.16 The Russian air force then expanded its target list to include Ukrainian military infrastructure, arms shipments from the West, fuel facilities, bridges, and even civilian targets. When we design a wargame or build a computer model, we assume adversaries are competent. In addition, Ukraine needs to conduct a sustained guerilla campaign behind Russian lines that involves ambushes, raids, sabotage, and subversion against Russian forces and political leaders hand-picked by Moscow to replace local Ukrainian officials. 2022 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The result in theory is a fairly selfsufficient ground combat unit with fire and rear support.25 In practice, the BTGs were likely understrength and lacked sufficient infantry. I strongly agree with these focus areas, but analysts have been paying attention to them for years. As Winston Churchill remarked on the eve of World War II, appeasement only increases a dictators appetite: And do not suppose that this is the end.
A day before the military invasion, for example, cyberattackers associated with the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) launched destructive wiper attacks on hundreds of systems in the Ukrainian government and in Ukraines energy, information technology, media, and financial sectors. As noted by Robert Doughty in The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919-1939, analysts examining the coming conflict prior to 1940 predicted that the battle would turn on whether German forces could penetrate French defenses, then sustain and exploit that breakthrough. First, as Carl von Clausewitz famously said in On War, war is the realm of chance and uncertainty. Over the previous several years, Russia had developed command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems on the battlefield, providing data to enable a higher throughput of airstrikes. Russia launched more than 1,100 missiles at Ukrainian targets over the first 21 days of the war and a total of 2,125 missiles over the first 68 days of the war.17. Over the first month and a half of the war, more than 40 percent of Russias destructive cyberattacks were aimed at Ukrainian critical infrastructure sectors, while another 32 percent targeted Ukrainian government sites.48, Russia also conducted an electronic warfare campaign against Ukrainian forces. Bans by the West on the export of sensitive technologies to Russia could also cut into Moscows ability to prosecute a protracted ground war. While tempting, this would be foolhardy. A Ukrainian serviceman steps on the barrel of a destroyed tank near the village of Malaya Rohan, Ukraine, April 1, 2022 (AP photo by Andrew Marienko). Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). Yet many of Russias failures will require years of changes and will force the Russian military to rethink its training, organizational structure, culture, and planning to improve readiness and military performance. First, the Russian military faced considerable logistics challenges, in part because of poor training and planning.
Instead, Ukrainian resilience has bested Russian incompetence, creating an initial Ukrainian upset that has now settled into brutal, attritional combat in the Donbas. and he will be burned to death.33 Russia utilized between 150,000 and 190,000 soldiersincluding regular and irregular forcesfor the initial invasion of Ukraine, a country of approximately 44 million people with an area of over 600,000 square kilometers.34 Those numbers translate into a force ratio of 4 Russian soldiers per 1,000 Ukrainian inhabitants. Following Russias failures during the First Chechen War (19941996), for example, Putin paused to revamp Russian strategy, operations, and tactics.60 In 1999, Russia restarted offensive operations and was much more successful in defeating insurgents during the Second Chechen War (19992009).61, The status quo is also unlikely to be acceptable for Ukrainian leaders, including President Volodymyr Zelensky, who indicated they are unwilling to allow more of their territory to be annexed.62Since 2014, Russia has illegally annexed salami slices of Ukrainian territory, first in Crimea, then in eastern Ukraine, and finally in larger areas of southern and eastern Ukraine. Russian military, intelligence, and police officials have penetrated cities and villages, rounding up and detaining protesters and pro-Ukrainian sympathizers.8. Doing it again today would be inexcusable. This brief is made possible by general support to CSIS. In the near term, this approach would likely underestimate Russias capacity to resist Ukrainian counter-offensives. U.S. understanding of Russian military performance was therefore specific to a different kind of conflict under different conditions. Doctrine, corroborated with data from exercises, wargames, operations, and intelligence, helps analysts understand how an opponent is likely to operate. It begins by providing an update on the war, including a tactical map of Russian and Ukrainian force disposition. First, the Russian army faced significant logistical and maintenance challenges operating in contested areas inside of Ukraine. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. Instead, Russian commanders pushed small units forward without combined-arms support, with predictably poor results. Two of Russias largest tank manufactures, for example, were forced to halt production because of a lack of parts.32. Russian soldiers frequently used unencrypted communicationsincluding civilian cell phoneswhich allowed Ukrainian intelligence and military units to target them.44, Russian difficulties in seizing territory created problems in the maritime domain. Third, modern analysts are hesitant to emphasize these attributes as it gets dangerously close to racist or essentialist descriptions of national character that have historically led analysts astray. He raises important questions about how analysts and policymakers assess military power. There were also signs of declining professionalism in the Russian officer corps, including prohibiting drivers from evacuating wounded Russian soldiers to preserve military equipment.43. It is worth considering an alternative path of events. What do these lessons indicate about the future of the war in Ukraine? This analysis suggests that Russia made significant mistakes during the planning and execution phases of its military campaigns in Ukraine, which will be difficult to fix quickly. OBrien argues that Western analysts obsession with technologies and doctrine blinded them to flaws in Russias ability to execute complex operations.
While the war in Ukraine is likely far from over, this analysis comes to several initial conclusions. CIA analysts focus on national leaders, while the Defense Intelligence Agency and military service analysts examine military leadership: both key individuals and the leadership cultures of adversary forces. But winning back territory will be difficult for Ukraine. Microsoft worked closely with the Ukrainian government and cybersecurity staff from other governments and private companies to identify and remediate Russian threat activity against Ukrainian networks before and after the Russian invasion.52 In January 2022, the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center identified wiper malware in over a dozen Ukrainian networks and alerted the Ukrainian government.53 Microsoft established a secure line of communication with Ukrainian cyber officials to provide real-time threat information and offer technical support to assist Ukrainian efforts to identify and defeat Russian-linked cyberattacks over the course of the war.54 Microsoft worked with Ukrainian government officials to enable controlled folder access, a Microsoft Defender feature, and helped Ukraine run endpoint detection and response solutions.55. Russias goal was likely to undermine Ukraines political will, weaken Ukraines ability to fight, and collect intelligence that Russia could use to gain tactical, operational, and strategic advantages. This meant that one of Russias primary ways to strike deep into Ukraine was through cruise missiles launched from Russia, Belarus, and maritime vessels in the Black Sea. Chris Dougherty is a senior fellow in the Defense Program and co-lead of the Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security. And yet, like Russian forces prior to their invasion of Ukraine, the performance of the Peoples Liberation Army remains a massive unknowable factor. In addition, Russian forces encountered numerous command and control problems, including a paucity of secure communications, which undermined their ability to synchronize and coordinate attacks. comprehensive analysis every weekday . Western analysis has long questioned the quality of Russian leadership, especially at the junior level. Nevertheless, Western analysts clearly overestimated Russias armed forces, which have demonstrated critical flaws and vulnerabilities. Russian-linked hackers used a range of common intrusion techniques, such as exploiting public-facing web-based applications, sending spear phishing e-mails with attachments or links, and stealing credentials and using valid e-mail accounts. For the Kremlin, the status quo is likely to be unacceptable. First, these issues are intangible and difficult to assess without firsthand knowledge. Cyber and Space Challenges: Russia conducted multiple cyber operations, including cyberattacks and espionage operations, in concert with Russian land, air, and maritime attacks. . The historian Philipps Payson OBrien, for example, wrote an article for The Atlantic early in the war comparing the Western failure to grasp Russian weakness to misguided assessments of French vulnerabilities prior to its defeat by Germany in 1940. Russian cyber and electronic warfare capabilities have largely been neutralized by effective Ukrainian countermeasures, with help from Western state and non-state entities. Examples include UAVs with a longer range and higher payload than the Bayraktar TB2 or AeroVironment Switchblade loitering munition, such as the MQ-1C Gray Eagle; main battle tanks, such as the Leopard 2 heavy battle tank; medium- and long-range missile systems, such as the HIMARS multiple-launch rocket system; and fighter aircraft, such asSu-25s. It is critical to understanding military effectiveness and predicting military performance. During a wargame several years ago, Massicot presciently cited command and control and logistics as factors that would limit Russias ability to execute complex operations against NATO.
This analysis examines lessons from Russian air, ground, cyber, and other domains following Moscows February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Warfare is an incredibly complex endeavor and boiling it down into a prediction through simplistic analysis has the accuracy of a stopped clock: occasionally right, but mostly wrong. While the structure of BTGs varies somewhat based on operational needs and available personnel, most include roughly 600 to 800 soldiersand, in Ukraine, perhaps closer to 600 soldiers. Over the previous few years, Russia had invested heavily in electronic warfare systems capable of shutting down communications and signals across a broad spectrum. Second, morale is dynamic and contingent the motivated Finnish forces that imposed heavy casualties on the Red Army during the Winter War, for example, became the cynical veterans of the Continuation War in Vin Linnas classic novel Unknown Soldiers. Russias failures will force the Russian military to fundamentally rethink its training practices, organizational structure, culture, logistics, recruitment and retention policies, and planning efforts.
Over the next several weeks, Russian actors linked to the GRU, Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and Federal Security Service (FSB) conducted numerous cyberattacks utilizing such malware families as: These types of malware are designed to do a range of malicious activities, such as overwriting data and rendering machines unbootable, deleting data, and destroyingor attempting to destroycritical infrastructure, such as industrial production and processes. Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness. Most of these systems will require additional training and a steady supply of munitions and spare parts, which should be feasible with a protracted war. Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2 UAVs apparently sank the patrol boats and landing craft.46. But controlling territory in a foreign country with a hostile Ukrainian population was deeply problematic for the Russian military, particularly since the conflict began to resemble a peoples war.3 In addition, Russian forces failed to effectively integrate combined arms to seize and hold Ukrainian territory, including coordination between land power, air power, and long-range fires. Likewise, these personnel challenges and persistent issues like hazing raise questions about Russian morale. . The obvious temptation is to discount the potential performance of Russian forces. In the early phases of the war, Russia aimed to pin down Ukrainian air defenses around the country by conducting ballistic and cruise missile strikes across the country, including Kh-101 cruise missiles deployed from Tu-95 Bear and Tu-160 Blackjack bombers flying in Russian and Belarusian airspace.16 The Russian air force then expanded its target list to include Ukrainian military infrastructure, arms shipments from the West, fuel facilities, bridges, and even civilian targets. When we design a wargame or build a computer model, we assume adversaries are competent. In addition, Ukraine needs to conduct a sustained guerilla campaign behind Russian lines that involves ambushes, raids, sabotage, and subversion against Russian forces and political leaders hand-picked by Moscow to replace local Ukrainian officials. 2022 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The result in theory is a fairly selfsufficient ground combat unit with fire and rear support.25 In practice, the BTGs were likely understrength and lacked sufficient infantry. I strongly agree with these focus areas, but analysts have been paying attention to them for years. As Winston Churchill remarked on the eve of World War II, appeasement only increases a dictators appetite: And do not suppose that this is the end. A day before the military invasion, for example, cyberattackers associated with the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) launched destructive wiper attacks on hundreds of systems in the Ukrainian government and in Ukraines energy, information technology, media, and financial sectors. As noted by Robert Doughty in The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919-1939, analysts examining the coming conflict prior to 1940 predicted that the battle would turn on whether German forces could penetrate French defenses, then sustain and exploit that breakthrough. First, as Carl von Clausewitz famously said in On War, war is the realm of chance and uncertainty. Over the previous several years, Russia had developed command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems on the battlefield, providing data to enable a higher throughput of airstrikes. Russia launched more than 1,100 missiles at Ukrainian targets over the first 21 days of the war and a total of 2,125 missiles over the first 68 days of the war.17. Over the first month and a half of the war, more than 40 percent of Russias destructive cyberattacks were aimed at Ukrainian critical infrastructure sectors, while another 32 percent targeted Ukrainian government sites.48, Russia also conducted an electronic warfare campaign against Ukrainian forces. Bans by the West on the export of sensitive technologies to Russia could also cut into Moscows ability to prosecute a protracted ground war. While tempting, this would be foolhardy. A Ukrainian serviceman steps on the barrel of a destroyed tank near the village of Malaya Rohan, Ukraine, April 1, 2022 (AP photo by Andrew Marienko). Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). Yet many of Russias failures will require years of changes and will force the Russian military to rethink its training, organizational structure, culture, and planning to improve readiness and military performance. First, the Russian military faced considerable logistics challenges, in part because of poor training and planning.
Instead, Ukrainian resilience has bested Russian incompetence, creating an initial Ukrainian upset that has now settled into brutal, attritional combat in the Donbas. and he will be burned to death.33 Russia utilized between 150,000 and 190,000 soldiersincluding regular and irregular forcesfor the initial invasion of Ukraine, a country of approximately 44 million people with an area of over 600,000 square kilometers.34 Those numbers translate into a force ratio of 4 Russian soldiers per 1,000 Ukrainian inhabitants. Following Russias failures during the First Chechen War (19941996), for example, Putin paused to revamp Russian strategy, operations, and tactics.60 In 1999, Russia restarted offensive operations and was much more successful in defeating insurgents during the Second Chechen War (19992009).61, The status quo is also unlikely to be acceptable for Ukrainian leaders, including President Volodymyr Zelensky, who indicated they are unwilling to allow more of their territory to be annexed.62Since 2014, Russia has illegally annexed salami slices of Ukrainian territory, first in Crimea, then in eastern Ukraine, and finally in larger areas of southern and eastern Ukraine. Russian military, intelligence, and police officials have penetrated cities and villages, rounding up and detaining protesters and pro-Ukrainian sympathizers.8. Doing it again today would be inexcusable. This brief is made possible by general support to CSIS. In the near term, this approach would likely underestimate Russias capacity to resist Ukrainian counter-offensives. U.S. understanding of Russian military performance was therefore specific to a different kind of conflict under different conditions. Doctrine, corroborated with data from exercises, wargames, operations, and intelligence, helps analysts understand how an opponent is likely to operate. It begins by providing an update on the war, including a tactical map of Russian and Ukrainian force disposition. First, the Russian army faced significant logistical and maintenance challenges operating in contested areas inside of Ukraine. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. Instead, Russian commanders pushed small units forward without combined-arms support, with predictably poor results. Two of Russias largest tank manufactures, for example, were forced to halt production because of a lack of parts.32. Russian soldiers frequently used unencrypted communicationsincluding civilian cell phoneswhich allowed Ukrainian intelligence and military units to target them.44, Russian difficulties in seizing territory created problems in the maritime domain. Third, modern analysts are hesitant to emphasize these attributes as it gets dangerously close to racist or essentialist descriptions of national character that have historically led analysts astray. He raises important questions about how analysts and policymakers assess military power. There were also signs of declining professionalism in the Russian officer corps, including prohibiting drivers from evacuating wounded Russian soldiers to preserve military equipment.43. It is worth considering an alternative path of events. What do these lessons indicate about the future of the war in Ukraine? This analysis suggests that Russia made significant mistakes during the planning and execution phases of its military campaigns in Ukraine, which will be difficult to fix quickly. OBrien argues that Western analysts obsession with technologies and doctrine blinded them to flaws in Russias ability to execute complex operations.