[21] This distrust of Russia only increased when stories (in certain cases fabricated and exaggerated) of behaviour such as vandalism from Red Army soldiers spread throughout the country. Tito realized that Yugoslavia could not bear the full brunt of the Soviet economic embargo that had followed the Cominforms decision in 1948. Article last reviewed: 2020 | St. Rosemary Institution 2010-2022 | Creative Commons 4.0. As has been mentioned, American announcement of the Truman Doctrine had no effect on the CPY regarding scaling back support for the Communist forces. It is published as part of our mission to showcase peer-leading papers written by students during their studies. Moreover, Vujacic points out that historical attempts to create a Russian nation state ultimately ended in failure. If Stalin were to achieve this, he would have managed to carve up Eastern Europe into three sizeable states, with all three wielding approximately equal influence, yet all significantly weaker than the Soviet Union. 35, No. To demonstrate this, I will firstly establish some of the core components of Stalins thinking in this period, before going on to show how disputes over Albania, Greece, and a Balkan Federation, proved to instigate the expulsion. Beginning in 1951, he started to accept western economic aid and negotiated loans and trade agreements with Britain, France, and the United States. 
This proved of little concern to Stalin, who was disinterested in the state, and had little involvement in its rebellion against Axis control. A new constitution that recognized Yugoslavias national diversity was just the beginning of sweeping political and economical reforms. Thus, it is apparent that after the split with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia began to develop its own type of Communist society. Consequently, Swain is correct to conclude that this ideological dispute was key in worsening Yugoslav-Soviet relations and contributing to the split. Lev Kopelev: Terror in the Countryside (Holodomor), Deng Xiaoping: Biography & Communist Commissioner, Cite this article as: William Anderson (Schoolworkhelper Editorial Team), "Tito-Stalin Dispute (1948): Timeline, Analysis, Significance," in, Tito-Stalin Dispute (1948): Timeline, Analysis,. As has been aforementioned these had failed. Stalin, in this period, was becoming increasingly conservative, in vast contrast to the revolutionary zeal of Titos Yugoslavia. However, Stalin was able to do little, preoccupied with the Soviets own fight against Nazi Germany This can be demonstrated with Tito establishing a provisional government in Jajce on 29th November 1943, rumoured to be against Stalins will, but powerless as he was at the Tehran Conference.[28]. Tito still maintained his policy of non-alignment and continued to be the leading speaker for the uncommitted nations of the world. What followed from Titos conciliation with the capitalist West was several years of mutual hostility between the Soviet and Yugoslav relations. The government also, relaxed its anti-church measures, permitted a degree of public criticism, limited the abuses of party officials privileges, and took the first step towards curving the absolute powers of the secret police by introducing a new criminal code.[22] None of these measures could have been carried out if Yugoslavia had remained in the politically restrictive and domineering coalition of the Cominform. In sum, this essay firstly dismissed the views espoused by Cominform and then by Vladimir Dedijer. While in places like Montenegro support for Stalin was high[19], many citizens were reluctant to the possibility of the USSR increasing their influence in the region. [61] This was extended in January 1948 when Dimitrov, in an unauthorised public statement, spoke about a projected Bulgarian-Greek-Yugoslav federation. Thus, Serbs followed Milosevic into a horrific war in which soldiers hoped that their heroic sacrifice would once again result in a strong nation state. Gradually, however, Tito began to relax his radical programs of nationalization and collectivization of Yugoslavias industrial and agrarian sectors. [60] By December 1947, the customs union was established, which also included Albania and Romania, with plans already set up for a future Communist Greece to join. 35, No. The GlobalEuropeProgram addresses vitalissues affecting the European continent, U.S.-European relations, and Europes ties with the rest of the world. During the war and the several years that followed Tito had managed to purge most, if not all, dissident elements within the Communist party and Yugoslavia itself. The program investigates European approaches to policy issues of importance to the United States, including globalization, digital transformation, climate, migration, global governance, and relations with Russia and Eurasia, China and the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East and Africa. [48], However, it would be wrong to say that Stalin was opposed to Titos interference in Albania, as on the whole, he had encouraged it. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973: a documentary survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), Cominform repeats Soviet charges, announces the expulsion of Yugoslavia, and calls on the CPY to replace its leaders, 28th June 1948, pp.202-207, Craig Nation, R., A Balkan Union? Titos expulsion from the Cominform signaled the beginning of Stalins campaign to smash Titoism, and whip the communist parties of Eastern Europe into line and establish there a series of identical dictatorships,[14] dictatorships that Stalin could control, manipulate, and exploit in order to maintain Moscows firm grip over the communist bloc. (Oxford, 2003) pp.50-56, Gibianskii, L., The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalins Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948 Cold War International History Bulletin 10, Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Issue 10 (1998) pp.112-118, Gibianskii, L., The Soviet-Yugoslav Split and the Cominform in Naimark, N. and Gibianksii (eds.)
In fact, in most cases, Yugoslavia had moved further to emulating the Soviet system than any other newly formed Communist state. Munevera Hadiehovi describes how most Muslims were opposed to the Russians due to their suppression of Muslims in central Asia and the perceived cultural disparity with the Russian Orthodox Church. Therefore, it becomes clear that in principle, the Soviet Union was not opposed to increasing Yugoslav influence in Albania, or even incorporation into Yugoslavia. Titos policy of nonalignment must be judged as a colossal triumph. [17] Therefore, despite most CPY members continuing to view the USSR as the abstract ideal[18] senior CPY members had perhaps refused to trust Stalin and regarded him with suspicion. [67] By doing this, it would thus become a lot easier for the Soviet Union to dominate Yugoslavia, and restrict Titos influence. The first section of the essay will deconstruct Cominforms official reasoning for the expulsion in order to illustrate that this was not justified. The Serbian popular imagination perceives Serbian statehood as having been achieved through heroic sacrifice in the face of overwhelming odds, as described by Dobrica Cosics in Time of Death. Conversely, Tito, was more vociferous in his attacks against the West and sought to continue to export revolution. Tauris, 2011), Swain, G. and Swain, N., Eastern Europe since 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1993), Tsakaloyannis, P., The Moscow Puzzle Journal of Contemporary History 21:1 (1986) pp.37-55, [1] Perovi, J., The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence Journal of Cold War Studies 9:2 (2007), p.34, [2] Dedijer, V., The battle Stalin lost: memoirs of Yugoslavia, 1948-1953 (New York: Viking, 1971), [3] Cominform repeats Soviet charges, announces the expulsion of Yugoslavia, and calls on the CPY to replace its leaders, 28th June 1948 found in: Clissold, S., (ed.) [33], While I have used the work of Swain to highlight how the CPY influenced the KKE, it was not just in Greece where Yugoslavia was influential. [30] Tito, questioning this, responded by reinforcing his own influence over Greece, encouraging the disastrous December uprising. Tito defended Yugoslavias acceptance of Western aid including military aid as being necessary not only to keep Yugoslavia independent but also as important for world defense against Soviet aggression.[16]. This reinforces the view that Yugoslavia posed a threat to Soviet hegemony. This was problematic for Stalin. To demonstrate this, I will examine the key flashpoints of Yugoslav interference in Albania, Greece, and their influence in a proposed Balkan Federation. Secondly, that there was an ideological dimension dispute over the role of popular fronts.
Perovi asserts how Yugoslavia was dedicated in pursuing the Stalinist route to socialism. To do this, as early as mid-1943, he proposed the idea of forming a united headquarters of the partisan movements of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece.
The issue of national sovereignty was the only ground on which Tito believed that he could legitimately, while still maintaining support within the Balkans, resist Stalin. Communist countries throughout Europe were encouraged to rely exclusively on the Soviet Union and strongly discouraged to follow independent revolutionary action. [52] Yugoslav rhetoric and support for the Communists increased even after the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, and condemnation from the UN. While at times he had praised their attempts at rebelling against the West, he did not want it to result in direct conflict, especially with the United States. The orthodox view that dominated Tito-era literature, subsequently accepted by Western scholars, was that the Tito-Stalin split was due to Yugoslavia, as early as 1941, pursuing a separate path towards socialism that could not be reconciled with the Soviet Union. From 1945 to the end of 1947, Shoup notes how although the USSR established the new Communist states, the new satellite leaders were in fact granted a considerable amount of freedom and flexibility that allowed them to consolidate their power in accordance with local conditions. On June 28th, 1948 the Cominform, the principle symbol of Stalins control over Eastern Europe, issued a resolution that formally expelled Yugoslavia from the assembly, citing that Yugoslavias ruler, Josep Broz-Tito, had deviated from the correct communist line of governance. Regardless of its increasing great power status, the Soviet Union, along with every other state, was now in the shadow of the United States, whose Gross National Product by 1950 was approximately three times that of the USSRs. This essay has demonstrated this through the major flashpoints of Albania, Greece and a proposed Balkan Federation, where in all three cases Yugoslavia had challenged Soviet supremacy.
Interregionalism Matters: Why ASEAN Is the Key to EU Strategic Autonomy. The Soviets and the Yugoslavian guerilla fighters shared the same anti-fascist sentiments towards the Germans and the same skepticism towards the wartime Yugoslavian government in exile. 1) Armstrong, Hamilton, Tito and Goliath, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1955), 2) Auty, Phyllis , Yugoslavia and the Cominform: Realignment of Foreign Policy, in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 3) Bass and Marbury, The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record, (New York: Prospect Books, 1959), 4) Clissold, Stephan ed., Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1939-1973, (London: Oxford University Pres, 1975), 5) Farrell, R. Barry Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1948-1956, (Yale: Shoe String Press, 1956), 6) Halperin, Ernst, The Triumphant Heretic: Titos Struggle Against Stalin, (London: Heinemann Ltd., 1958), 7) Korbonski, Andrzej, The Impact of the Soviet-Yugoslav Rift on World Communism, in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 8) Swain, Geoffrey, The Cominform: Titos International in The Historical Journal, Vol. Thus, Tito began to implement socio-economic programs distinct from the Soviet Union. This essay now argues that the instigator for Yugoslavias expulsion was Stalins increased desire to cement his hegemony over Eastern Europe. (eds.) This can be reinforced as during the same period, Moscow also heavily criticised the Polish and Czechoslovak leadership, accusing them of committing similar crimes as Yugoslavia. This scepticism of the Soviet Union can be extended to large sections of the Yugoslav population. Tito and his communist cadres wanted to prove to the communist world at large that they were staunch Marxist Leninists and that any proposition to the contrary was false.[21]. Stalin contended that Tito was guilty of flouting the unified communist front against imperialism[1] and he also accused Tito of taking the road to nationalism.[2]. [3] This accusation is repeated numerous times in the communiqu. Marxism was the ideological framework in which Titos policies were legitimized. The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I, Origins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) pp.198-220, Roberts, G., Stalins Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953 (London, Yale University Press, 2006), Ridley, J., Tito (London: Constable, 1994), Shoup, P., Communism, Nationalism and the Growth of the Communist Community of Nations after World War II The American Political Science Review 56:4 (1962) pp.886-898, Swain, G., The Cominform: Titos International? The Historical Journal 45:3 (1992) pp.641-663, Swain, G., Tito: A Biography (London, New York: I.B. With the Soviet Union responsible for setting up all Communist governments in Europe apart from Yugoslavia and Albania, it would have come as a shock that any other state would have attempted to influence those governments, and thus challenge Stalins dominance. Mass collectivization of agriculture began to subside while decentralization and wider self-government followed. Therefore, it is clear that the disagreements over Greece were central to the conflict, for that they exposed substantial foreign policy differences between Tito and Stalin. Alongside the aversion to the Soviet Union, Swain has argued that there was an ideological element to the dispute. and Westad, O.A. Barring economic trade and amassing Soviet troops on Yugoslavias border did little but strengthen Titos resolute stance. [36] This was successful, as by late 1947, Bulgaria and Romania had adapted to the Yugoslav style of popular fronts. Acting as General and Marshal of the Yugoslavian partisan movement during the war period, Josep Broz-Tito managed to successfully liberate the Slavic peoples from Nazi rule.
Tito began to flex a political line that was distinct and separate from Stalins political doctrine. Partly, this is due to Yugoslavia acting as the transmitter for Moscows messages to the rest of Europe, which de facto gave Tito increased influence. Secondly, ideological differences over the nature of popular fronts. However, Stalins reluctance to aid the Greek Communists tells us greatly about his rationale and thinking. [6] Banac writes that the CPY rapidly adopted Soviet policies, across all aspects of society. 
Despite Belgrades almost worship-like stance to Moscow, as will be mentioned, it had been pursuing to expand its influence across the region since its existence. Tito was quick to realize, however, that Yugoslavias ethnic and nationalist diversity would threaten the stability and efficiency of a purely central system of government. In his attempt to solve this puzzle, Vujacic pored through Russian and Serbian literature for cultural cues that affected the behavior of nationalist sympathizers. While they were key, they were not the most causal factors in the run-up to the split. [7] Additionally, Banac claims how education, press, publishing, literature and the arts, theatre and film were sovietised. Tito understood that in order to maintain control over the Balkans he had to amalgamate and consolidate the regions that made up Yugoslavia with the hope of holding the regions together under one distinct, sovereign nation. Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy, Environmental Change and Security Program, North Korea International Documentation Project, Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, The Middle East and North Africa Workforce Development Initiative, Science and Technology Innovation Program. Thus, with being unable to remove him, from Stalins perspective, he had no choice but to expel Yugoslavia from Cominform. This event proves vital in understanding the history of Yugoslavia as well as post-war Communism, as it marked the first official rift between Communist states. [4] Thirdly, the communiqu states that nationalism has infiltrated the senior ranks of the Party and subsequently impacts policy.
Following victory, Yugoslav leaders sought to expand their ideological clout. The spirit of Yugoslavian nationalism threatened to encourage nationalism throughout the whole communist empire. However, in disagreement with Titos plans, (who wanted Bulgaria to have status equivalent to one of the Yugoslav republics) he wanted Bulgaria to have equal rights to Yugoslavia, essentially emulating the former structure of Austria-Hungary.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACFB73.pdf. Tito contended that internal power, rationality, and national interest held primacy[5], over aligning Yugoslavian communism directly with the Soviet Union. B.) For instance, leader of Italian partisans Luigo Longo, informed Dimitrov in July 1944 of the success of the partisans and their potential for power via Zagreb rather than via Rome, where Soviet advisers resided. After Tito had allowed the republics and provinces to receive greater control over local matters, a system of self-management in the working sector of society commenced in 1950. Although the event most often used to mobilize nationalists is the fourteenth century battle for Kosovo, Vujacic outlined a succession of historical events that have been used by politicians to keep this memory alive. Before you download your free e-book, please consider donating to Secondly, I will also deconstruct the traditional orthodox view, established by official Yugoslav historian Vladimir Dedijer[2], as it proved to be misleading. [35], However, what would have worried Stalin the most was that this did not stop at the wars end. Instead, the principle reason for the expulsion was due to Stalin, from late 1947, becoming increasingly eager to reinforce and increase his hegemonic control over Eastern Europe as the Cold War became more apparent. These dissident elements were purged from the government and imprisoned. [59], As aforementioned, Yugoslavia had already been expanding its ties with neighbours Albania since the end of WWII. The ultimate result of Titos expulsion was an extremely successful foreign policy that is best summarized by the word nonalignment.[7]. [53] This widely contrasts with the Soviet Union, who were hesitant to help the KKE, with Stalin instead preferring an end to the conflict and the KKE to pursue parliamentary means. After Stalins death in 1953 tension between Tito and the Soviet Union became a bit more relaxed. Regarding agriculture, by March 1948, 347,441 hectares of land in Yugoslavia, largely comprising of confiscated farms in Vojvodina, were under cooperative cultivation. Yugoslavia, in the post-war period, had also managed to maintain its own foreign policy. Tito was able to maintain a firm grip over his country through his strong police force and his tight political grip over the Yugoslavian Communist Party. [26], This was opposed by Stalin, who had been sceptical of popular fronts from below since events during the Spanish Civil War, during which Swain writes he betrayed the popular front movement in favour of a pact with Nazi Germany. [5], Historiography, from both the era of the split and contemporary findings, is rightfully unanimous in rejecting Cominforms accusations. In short, Tito favored a federal system of a communist government. 3 (GB: Cambridge University Press, Sep., 1992) p. 642, 9) Zimmerman, William, Yugoslav Strategies of Survival 1948-1980, in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), [1] Hamilton Armstrong, Tito and Goliath, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1955) p. XI, [3] Bass and Marbury, The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record, (New York: Prospect Books, 1959) p. XII, [4] Stephen Clissold ed., Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1939-1973, (London: Oxford University Pres, 1975) p. 20, [5] R. Barry Farrell, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1948-1956, (Yale: Shoe String Press, 1956) p. 1, [6] Bass and Marbury, The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58, p. XVI, [7] William Zimmerman, Yugoslav Strategies of Survival 1948-1980, in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 26, [9] Andrzej Korbonski, The Impact of the Soviet-Yugoslav Rift on World Communism, in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 2, [11] Ernst Halperin, The Triumphant Heretic: Titos Struggle Against Stalin, (London: Heinemann Ltd., 1958), p. 67, [12] Geoffrey Swain, The Cominform: Titos International in The Historical Journal, Vol. Between then and the next few months, extraordinary messages were exchanged between members of the Soviet and Yugoslav hierarchy, where each side accused the other of multiple crimes. The explanation provided by Cominform was never truly been taken seriously by scholars and the media. Your donations allow us to invest in new open access titles and pay our A., (eds.) Furthermore, he refused to take sides on Cold War issues. [70] After the escalation in tensions, on June 28th, Yugoslavia was expelled from Cominform. Bjelakovic concludes that in 1947 the Soviets sent more military instructors, engineers, doctors, and other technical personnel than Yugoslavia.[51]. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973: a documentary survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.202, [6] Perovi, The Tito-Stalin Split p.34, [7] Banac, I., With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism (Ithaca, NY, London: Cornell University Press, 1988), p.22, [9] Perovi, The Tito-Stalin Split p.37, [10] Bjelakovic, N., Comrades and Adversaries: Yugoslav-Soviet Conflict in 1948 A Reappraisal East European Quarterly 33:1 (1999), p.101, [11] Gibianskii, L., The Soviet-Yugoslav Split and the Cominform in Naimark, N. and Gibianksii, L., (eds.) The gradual release of Soviet and Yugoslav era archives has invalidated the view espoused by Dedijer. The constitution encouraged direct control over all state activities by the Communist party, as well as the subjugation of a federal system of government in favor of a strong central order. Stalins increasing unwillingness to allow other states to have their own foreign policies is clear when looking at events in Greece. Instead, other interpretations have developed. Firstly, that scepticism towards increasing Soviet influence was present since the late 1930s amongst large sections of the population and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY). Kremlin officials feared that Titos renegade nature would enhance the chances of revolts in both Hungary and Poland. Unaware of Titos popularity amongst the Party members and the population, the USSR failed in their attempts to purge him and his close associates. Likewise, Stalin obviously realised even if Titos power was limited through a federation, Yugoslavia would still comprise the dominant proportion of Europes second most powerful Communist State, therefore having the potential to influence neighbouring countries. [10] Gibianskii rightfully concludes that the only truth to the Soviets accusations was their criticism of anti-democratic procedures in the CPY and the secret nature of its activity, however, in reality the Kremlin had little concern for this. Therefore, with Stalin proposing two other federations between Poland and Czechoslovakia, and Romania and Hungary, this would diminish the potential for Yugoslav influence. [20] It is interesting to note that Yugoslavias immediate reaction to their expulsion from the Cominform was to radicalize, and not liberalize, their Marxist policies. These were an essential part of Titos newly established state while opposed by Stalin. Swain writes how Yugoslav communists were regularly in contact with Italian, Bulgarian, and French communist movements.
This proved of little concern to Stalin, who was disinterested in the state, and had little involvement in its rebellion against Axis control. A new constitution that recognized Yugoslavias national diversity was just the beginning of sweeping political and economical reforms. Thus, it is apparent that after the split with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia began to develop its own type of Communist society. Consequently, Swain is correct to conclude that this ideological dispute was key in worsening Yugoslav-Soviet relations and contributing to the split. Lev Kopelev: Terror in the Countryside (Holodomor), Deng Xiaoping: Biography & Communist Commissioner, Cite this article as: William Anderson (Schoolworkhelper Editorial Team), "Tito-Stalin Dispute (1948): Timeline, Analysis, Significance," in, Tito-Stalin Dispute (1948): Timeline, Analysis,. As has been aforementioned these had failed. Stalin, in this period, was becoming increasingly conservative, in vast contrast to the revolutionary zeal of Titos Yugoslavia. However, Stalin was able to do little, preoccupied with the Soviets own fight against Nazi Germany This can be demonstrated with Tito establishing a provisional government in Jajce on 29th November 1943, rumoured to be against Stalins will, but powerless as he was at the Tehran Conference.[28]. Tito still maintained his policy of non-alignment and continued to be the leading speaker for the uncommitted nations of the world. What followed from Titos conciliation with the capitalist West was several years of mutual hostility between the Soviet and Yugoslav relations. The government also, relaxed its anti-church measures, permitted a degree of public criticism, limited the abuses of party officials privileges, and took the first step towards curving the absolute powers of the secret police by introducing a new criminal code.[22] None of these measures could have been carried out if Yugoslavia had remained in the politically restrictive and domineering coalition of the Cominform. In sum, this essay firstly dismissed the views espoused by Cominform and then by Vladimir Dedijer. While in places like Montenegro support for Stalin was high[19], many citizens were reluctant to the possibility of the USSR increasing their influence in the region. [61] This was extended in January 1948 when Dimitrov, in an unauthorised public statement, spoke about a projected Bulgarian-Greek-Yugoslav federation. Thus, Serbs followed Milosevic into a horrific war in which soldiers hoped that their heroic sacrifice would once again result in a strong nation state. Gradually, however, Tito began to relax his radical programs of nationalization and collectivization of Yugoslavias industrial and agrarian sectors. [60] By December 1947, the customs union was established, which also included Albania and Romania, with plans already set up for a future Communist Greece to join. 35, No. The GlobalEuropeProgram addresses vitalissues affecting the European continent, U.S.-European relations, and Europes ties with the rest of the world. During the war and the several years that followed Tito had managed to purge most, if not all, dissident elements within the Communist party and Yugoslavia itself. The program investigates European approaches to policy issues of importance to the United States, including globalization, digital transformation, climate, migration, global governance, and relations with Russia and Eurasia, China and the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East and Africa. [48], However, it would be wrong to say that Stalin was opposed to Titos interference in Albania, as on the whole, he had encouraged it. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973: a documentary survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), Cominform repeats Soviet charges, announces the expulsion of Yugoslavia, and calls on the CPY to replace its leaders, 28th June 1948, pp.202-207, Craig Nation, R., A Balkan Union? Titos expulsion from the Cominform signaled the beginning of Stalins campaign to smash Titoism, and whip the communist parties of Eastern Europe into line and establish there a series of identical dictatorships,[14] dictatorships that Stalin could control, manipulate, and exploit in order to maintain Moscows firm grip over the communist bloc. (Oxford, 2003) pp.50-56, Gibianskii, L., The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalins Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948 Cold War International History Bulletin 10, Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Issue 10 (1998) pp.112-118, Gibianskii, L., The Soviet-Yugoslav Split and the Cominform in Naimark, N. and Gibianksii (eds.) In fact, in most cases, Yugoslavia had moved further to emulating the Soviet system than any other newly formed Communist state. Munevera Hadiehovi describes how most Muslims were opposed to the Russians due to their suppression of Muslims in central Asia and the perceived cultural disparity with the Russian Orthodox Church. Therefore, it becomes clear that in principle, the Soviet Union was not opposed to increasing Yugoslav influence in Albania, or even incorporation into Yugoslavia. Titos policy of nonalignment must be judged as a colossal triumph. [17] Therefore, despite most CPY members continuing to view the USSR as the abstract ideal[18] senior CPY members had perhaps refused to trust Stalin and regarded him with suspicion. [67] By doing this, it would thus become a lot easier for the Soviet Union to dominate Yugoslavia, and restrict Titos influence. The first section of the essay will deconstruct Cominforms official reasoning for the expulsion in order to illustrate that this was not justified. The Serbian popular imagination perceives Serbian statehood as having been achieved through heroic sacrifice in the face of overwhelming odds, as described by Dobrica Cosics in Time of Death. Conversely, Tito, was more vociferous in his attacks against the West and sought to continue to export revolution. Tauris, 2011), Swain, G. and Swain, N., Eastern Europe since 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1993), Tsakaloyannis, P., The Moscow Puzzle Journal of Contemporary History 21:1 (1986) pp.37-55, [1] Perovi, J., The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence Journal of Cold War Studies 9:2 (2007), p.34, [2] Dedijer, V., The battle Stalin lost: memoirs of Yugoslavia, 1948-1953 (New York: Viking, 1971), [3] Cominform repeats Soviet charges, announces the expulsion of Yugoslavia, and calls on the CPY to replace its leaders, 28th June 1948 found in: Clissold, S., (ed.) [33], While I have used the work of Swain to highlight how the CPY influenced the KKE, it was not just in Greece where Yugoslavia was influential. [30] Tito, questioning this, responded by reinforcing his own influence over Greece, encouraging the disastrous December uprising. Tito defended Yugoslavias acceptance of Western aid including military aid as being necessary not only to keep Yugoslavia independent but also as important for world defense against Soviet aggression.[16]. This reinforces the view that Yugoslavia posed a threat to Soviet hegemony. This was problematic for Stalin. To demonstrate this, I will examine the key flashpoints of Yugoslav interference in Albania, Greece, and their influence in a proposed Balkan Federation. Secondly, that there was an ideological dimension dispute over the role of popular fronts.
Perovi asserts how Yugoslavia was dedicated in pursuing the Stalinist route to socialism. To do this, as early as mid-1943, he proposed the idea of forming a united headquarters of the partisan movements of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece.
Interregionalism Matters: Why ASEAN Is the Key to EU Strategic Autonomy. The Soviets and the Yugoslavian guerilla fighters shared the same anti-fascist sentiments towards the Germans and the same skepticism towards the wartime Yugoslavian government in exile. 1) Armstrong, Hamilton, Tito and Goliath, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1955), 2) Auty, Phyllis , Yugoslavia and the Cominform: Realignment of Foreign Policy, in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 3) Bass and Marbury, The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record, (New York: Prospect Books, 1959), 4) Clissold, Stephan ed., Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1939-1973, (London: Oxford University Pres, 1975), 5) Farrell, R. Barry Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1948-1956, (Yale: Shoe String Press, 1956), 6) Halperin, Ernst, The Triumphant Heretic: Titos Struggle Against Stalin, (London: Heinemann Ltd., 1958), 7) Korbonski, Andrzej, The Impact of the Soviet-Yugoslav Rift on World Communism, in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 8) Swain, Geoffrey, The Cominform: Titos International in The Historical Journal, Vol. Thus, Tito began to implement socio-economic programs distinct from the Soviet Union. This essay now argues that the instigator for Yugoslavias expulsion was Stalins increased desire to cement his hegemony over Eastern Europe. (eds.) This can be reinforced as during the same period, Moscow also heavily criticised the Polish and Czechoslovak leadership, accusing them of committing similar crimes as Yugoslavia. This scepticism of the Soviet Union can be extended to large sections of the Yugoslav population. Tito and his communist cadres wanted to prove to the communist world at large that they were staunch Marxist Leninists and that any proposition to the contrary was false.[21]. Stalin contended that Tito was guilty of flouting the unified communist front against imperialism[1] and he also accused Tito of taking the road to nationalism.[2]. [3] This accusation is repeated numerous times in the communiqu. Marxism was the ideological framework in which Titos policies were legitimized. The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I, Origins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) pp.198-220, Roberts, G., Stalins Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953 (London, Yale University Press, 2006), Ridley, J., Tito (London: Constable, 1994), Shoup, P., Communism, Nationalism and the Growth of the Communist Community of Nations after World War II The American Political Science Review 56:4 (1962) pp.886-898, Swain, G., The Cominform: Titos International? The Historical Journal 45:3 (1992) pp.641-663, Swain, G., Tito: A Biography (London, New York: I.B. With the Soviet Union responsible for setting up all Communist governments in Europe apart from Yugoslavia and Albania, it would have come as a shock that any other state would have attempted to influence those governments, and thus challenge Stalins dominance. Mass collectivization of agriculture began to subside while decentralization and wider self-government followed. Therefore, it is clear that the disagreements over Greece were central to the conflict, for that they exposed substantial foreign policy differences between Tito and Stalin. Alongside the aversion to the Soviet Union, Swain has argued that there was an ideological element to the dispute. and Westad, O.A. Barring economic trade and amassing Soviet troops on Yugoslavias border did little but strengthen Titos resolute stance. [36] This was successful, as by late 1947, Bulgaria and Romania had adapted to the Yugoslav style of popular fronts. Acting as General and Marshal of the Yugoslavian partisan movement during the war period, Josep Broz-Tito managed to successfully liberate the Slavic peoples from Nazi rule.
Tito began to flex a political line that was distinct and separate from Stalins political doctrine. Partly, this is due to Yugoslavia acting as the transmitter for Moscows messages to the rest of Europe, which de facto gave Tito increased influence. Secondly, ideological differences over the nature of popular fronts. However, Stalins reluctance to aid the Greek Communists tells us greatly about his rationale and thinking. [6] Banac writes that the CPY rapidly adopted Soviet policies, across all aspects of society. Despite Belgrades almost worship-like stance to Moscow, as will be mentioned, it had been pursuing to expand its influence across the region since its existence. Tito was quick to realize, however, that Yugoslavias ethnic and nationalist diversity would threaten the stability and efficiency of a purely central system of government. In his attempt to solve this puzzle, Vujacic pored through Russian and Serbian literature for cultural cues that affected the behavior of nationalist sympathizers. While they were key, they were not the most causal factors in the run-up to the split. [7] Additionally, Banac claims how education, press, publishing, literature and the arts, theatre and film were sovietised. Tito understood that in order to maintain control over the Balkans he had to amalgamate and consolidate the regions that made up Yugoslavia with the hope of holding the regions together under one distinct, sovereign nation. Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy, Environmental Change and Security Program, North Korea International Documentation Project, Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, The Middle East and North Africa Workforce Development Initiative, Science and Technology Innovation Program. Thus, with being unable to remove him, from Stalins perspective, he had no choice but to expel Yugoslavia from Cominform. This event proves vital in understanding the history of Yugoslavia as well as post-war Communism, as it marked the first official rift between Communist states. [4] Thirdly, the communiqu states that nationalism has infiltrated the senior ranks of the Party and subsequently impacts policy. Following victory, Yugoslav leaders sought to expand their ideological clout. The spirit of Yugoslavian nationalism threatened to encourage nationalism throughout the whole communist empire. However, in disagreement with Titos plans, (who wanted Bulgaria to have status equivalent to one of the Yugoslav republics) he wanted Bulgaria to have equal rights to Yugoslavia, essentially emulating the former structure of Austria-Hungary.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACFB73.pdf. Tito contended that internal power, rationality, and national interest held primacy[5], over aligning Yugoslavian communism directly with the Soviet Union. B.) For instance, leader of Italian partisans Luigo Longo, informed Dimitrov in July 1944 of the success of the partisans and their potential for power via Zagreb rather than via Rome, where Soviet advisers resided. After Tito had allowed the republics and provinces to receive greater control over local matters, a system of self-management in the working sector of society commenced in 1950. Although the event most often used to mobilize nationalists is the fourteenth century battle for Kosovo, Vujacic outlined a succession of historical events that have been used by politicians to keep this memory alive. Before you download your free e-book, please consider donating to Secondly, I will also deconstruct the traditional orthodox view, established by official Yugoslav historian Vladimir Dedijer[2], as it proved to be misleading. [35], However, what would have worried Stalin the most was that this did not stop at the wars end. Instead, the principle reason for the expulsion was due to Stalin, from late 1947, becoming increasingly eager to reinforce and increase his hegemonic control over Eastern Europe as the Cold War became more apparent. These dissident elements were purged from the government and imprisoned. [59], As aforementioned, Yugoslavia had already been expanding its ties with neighbours Albania since the end of WWII. The ultimate result of Titos expulsion was an extremely successful foreign policy that is best summarized by the word nonalignment.[7]. [53] This widely contrasts with the Soviet Union, who were hesitant to help the KKE, with Stalin instead preferring an end to the conflict and the KKE to pursue parliamentary means. After Stalins death in 1953 tension between Tito and the Soviet Union became a bit more relaxed. Regarding agriculture, by March 1948, 347,441 hectares of land in Yugoslavia, largely comprising of confiscated farms in Vojvodina, were under cooperative cultivation. Yugoslavia, in the post-war period, had also managed to maintain its own foreign policy. Tito was able to maintain a firm grip over his country through his strong police force and his tight political grip over the Yugoslavian Communist Party. [26], This was opposed by Stalin, who had been sceptical of popular fronts from below since events during the Spanish Civil War, during which Swain writes he betrayed the popular front movement in favour of a pact with Nazi Germany. [5], Historiography, from both the era of the split and contemporary findings, is rightfully unanimous in rejecting Cominforms accusations. In short, Tito favored a federal system of a communist government. 3 (GB: Cambridge University Press, Sep., 1992) p. 642, 9) Zimmerman, William, Yugoslav Strategies of Survival 1948-1980, in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), [1] Hamilton Armstrong, Tito and Goliath, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1955) p. XI, [3] Bass and Marbury, The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record, (New York: Prospect Books, 1959) p. XII, [4] Stephen Clissold ed., Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1939-1973, (London: Oxford University Pres, 1975) p. 20, [5] R. Barry Farrell, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1948-1956, (Yale: Shoe String Press, 1956) p. 1, [6] Bass and Marbury, The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58, p. XVI, [7] William Zimmerman, Yugoslav Strategies of Survival 1948-1980, in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 26, [9] Andrzej Korbonski, The Impact of the Soviet-Yugoslav Rift on World Communism, in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 2, [11] Ernst Halperin, The Triumphant Heretic: Titos Struggle Against Stalin, (London: Heinemann Ltd., 1958), p. 67, [12] Geoffrey Swain, The Cominform: Titos International in The Historical Journal, Vol. Between then and the next few months, extraordinary messages were exchanged between members of the Soviet and Yugoslav hierarchy, where each side accused the other of multiple crimes. The explanation provided by Cominform was never truly been taken seriously by scholars and the media. Your donations allow us to invest in new open access titles and pay our A., (eds.) Furthermore, he refused to take sides on Cold War issues. [70] After the escalation in tensions, on June 28th, Yugoslavia was expelled from Cominform. Bjelakovic concludes that in 1947 the Soviets sent more military instructors, engineers, doctors, and other technical personnel than Yugoslavia.[51]. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973: a documentary survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.202, [6] Perovi, The Tito-Stalin Split p.34, [7] Banac, I., With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism (Ithaca, NY, London: Cornell University Press, 1988), p.22, [9] Perovi, The Tito-Stalin Split p.37, [10] Bjelakovic, N., Comrades and Adversaries: Yugoslav-Soviet Conflict in 1948 A Reappraisal East European Quarterly 33:1 (1999), p.101, [11] Gibianskii, L., The Soviet-Yugoslav Split and the Cominform in Naimark, N. and Gibianksii, L., (eds.) The gradual release of Soviet and Yugoslav era archives has invalidated the view espoused by Dedijer. The constitution encouraged direct control over all state activities by the Communist party, as well as the subjugation of a federal system of government in favor of a strong central order. Stalins increasing unwillingness to allow other states to have their own foreign policies is clear when looking at events in Greece. Instead, other interpretations have developed. Firstly, that scepticism towards increasing Soviet influence was present since the late 1930s amongst large sections of the population and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY). Kremlin officials feared that Titos renegade nature would enhance the chances of revolts in both Hungary and Poland. Unaware of Titos popularity amongst the Party members and the population, the USSR failed in their attempts to purge him and his close associates. Likewise, Stalin obviously realised even if Titos power was limited through a federation, Yugoslavia would still comprise the dominant proportion of Europes second most powerful Communist State, therefore having the potential to influence neighbouring countries. [10] Gibianskii rightfully concludes that the only truth to the Soviets accusations was their criticism of anti-democratic procedures in the CPY and the secret nature of its activity, however, in reality the Kremlin had little concern for this. Therefore, with Stalin proposing two other federations between Poland and Czechoslovakia, and Romania and Hungary, this would diminish the potential for Yugoslav influence. [20] It is interesting to note that Yugoslavias immediate reaction to their expulsion from the Cominform was to radicalize, and not liberalize, their Marxist policies. These were an essential part of Titos newly established state while opposed by Stalin. Swain writes how Yugoslav communists were regularly in contact with Italian, Bulgarian, and French communist movements.