Little attention was paid to the role of civil society and communal self-empowerment except as a supplement to the Brotherhoods real goal of taking over the existing political order. As a result, the organization embraced two conflicting tendencies: one that stressed the dangers of societal corruption and the need to separate oneself from it, and another that attempted to engage society by setting a positive example. However, while these tools were successful in limiting intra-organizational conflict, they led many of the Brotherhoods fresh talent, who were unwilling to fall into line with the movements rigid ideology and structure, to abandon the group. The Brotherhood also inflated the political component of its Islamist mission.11 Political power, instead of societal Islamization based on changing the hearts and minds of the population, became the movements key objective. Increasing social resentment manifested itself over time in the Islamists sectarian hate speech, threats against freedom and secular lifestyles, and concrete policies in the (albeit short-lived) elected parliament, which failed to address economic crises or improve living conditions and public services. The Brotherhoods rigid, hierarchical structure led the group to hold on to certain ideas that negatively impacted its political trajectory, particularly after it assumed power. By doing so, he has attempted to undermine the organizations claims to epitomize moderate Islamism and portray the regime as the defender of the Muslim mainstream. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). The inclusion of Islamists within a democratic political system could have limited the negative impacts of this ideological dissonance. Subsequently, the concept evolved into an integral part of the Brotherhoods historical narrative and self-image. Any democracy must rest on a notion of civic ethics or a set of principles that structure relations among members of the community on the basis of political equality and mutual respect. This could provide new political openings for opposition to the president, affecting Egypts stability. However, the number is likely around the 5.8 million voters who cast their ballots for Morsi in the first round of the presidential election, given the depiction of Morsi as the only Islamist candidate in the race.
But it is equally true that the Brotherhoods vision was limited from the outset. It also confiscated the organizations assets and closed affiliated social welfare associations. The Brotherhoods choice to belittle the opposition as conspirators and Islam haters reflected an inability to engage with other viewpoints to build a broader support network. Finally, core components of the Brotherhoods ideology were undemocratic, putting the organization at odds with efforts toward a moderate democratic transition in Egypt, a shift of which it purported to be a part. Discussion of organizational reform was generally limited to talk of changing the groups bylaws and disregarded the more important need for reform in organizational mentality and administrative structure. Brotherhood leaders often liked to depict themselves as centrists but always did so in religious terms, locating the Brotherhood in between the literalism and extremism of the Salafists and the secularism of the liberals and leftists. An armed branch organized in the early 1940s was subsequently linked to a number of violent acts, including bombings and political assassinations, and it appears that the armed element of the group began to escape Hassan al-Bannas control. Its organizational introversion and conspiratorial mind-set also undermined its ability to build a broad network of support. The Brotherhood also avoided any serious discussion of restructuring the police force or bringing police officers to justice for past crimes. Second, the Brotherhood demonstrated a ghetto mentality. Their frightening theocratic discourse raised serious concerns among many Egyptians that radical democratic politics aimed at dismantling the old state could pave the way for a takeover by sectarian, intolerant, and reactionary Islamists. Brotherhood leaders did not necessarily advocate violence or engage often in outright hate speech, but the discriminatory tone of their rhetoric was unmistakable. Official regime rhetoric affirming such a link and the existence of an alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and militants affiliated with al-Qaeda or the self-proclaimed Islamic State group is not based on any conclusive evidence, but merely on an inference that there must be an ideological relationship due to Sayyid Qutbs legacy. Part 1 of a series on political Islam in Egypt. The organizations inclusion in the political system did not lead to its democratization and moderation, as some observers had predicted it would. Stay connected to Sada with a new smartphone app for Android and iOS devices, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW As a result, the Brotherhood failed to transform its electoral domination into sustainable political hegemony. While the Muslim Brotherhood retains a pyramidal command structure, with key powers culminating in the Office of the Supreme Guide and the Guidance Office, its intraorganizational lines of communication do not necessarily follow hierarchical patterns. Corrections? 31 The 2012 constitution, which the Brotherhood drafted, granted the military unprecedented privileges, including the lack of any parliamentary oversight of the military budget and the exclusive right of the military-dominated National Defense Council and National Security Council to make strategic decisions related to war and peace and national security. The Brotherhoods new adherents aimed to reorganize society and government according to Islamic doctrines, and they were vehemently anti-Western. 
What happened? Please refer to the appropriate style manual or other sources if you have any questions. The aim was to create a strong, unified organization ruled by a politicized elite yet with a mass following based primarily on religious and social values. The Brotherhood was thereby able to maintain group unity while ensuring that the organization could still function freely on the local level in a decentralized way, even in the face of regime repression.
First, the Brotherhood presented an ideology broad enough to accommodate multiple irreconcilable ideas. What Are the Major Takeaways of Joe Bidens Recent Trip to the Middle East? Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Renegotiating Civil-Military Relations in Arab States, tens of thousands of people faced charges, different visions of how to adequately react, disagreements over whether to undertake a range of actions, remain in charge of the organizations administration, repression by then president Gamal Abdel Nassers regime during the 1950s and 1960s, regimes of presidents Anwar al-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, support for imprisoned members and their families, new media that permit relatively secure networking activities, used to express internal discontent and voice radical views, not a priority for the Muslim Brotherhood today, associated the Brotherhood with religious extremism, resonates positively with international actors, Salafism as a viable ideological alternative, has publicly called for nonviolent political change, their anti-Sisi stance has not brought them ideologically closer to Salafi-jihadi militancy, emphasis on gradualism needs to be revised, Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, new political openings for opposition to the president. The conflict brought to the fore disagreements over whether to undertake a range of actions from civil disobedience to vandalizing public installations and ransacking police stations and public buildings. The Brotherhood also created local networks of its own members in the Delta to mimic traditional village councils, strengthen group solidarity, and win recognition and votes. Similarly, the revolutionary fervor of the younger generation is not so much inspired by Sayyid Qutbs radicalism, as stirred by disenchantment with the Arab uprisings of 2011, the horror of the Rabaa al-Adawiya massacre of Muslim Brotherhood protesters in August 2013, and shock at the extent of the regimes clampdown. Historically, the state sidelined the Brotherhood and other Islamist movements, but they nevertheless blossomed in the vacuum created by the states socioeconomic ineptitude. Stay connected to Diwan wtih the smartphone app for Android and iOS devices, Emir Bechir Street, Lazarieh Tower Key milestones include Morsis dictatorial presidential decrees in 2012, the two cabinets of Prime Minister Hesham Qandil in 2012 and 2013, the 2012 constitution-writing and voting process, clashes between Brotherhood and opposition supporters in 2012 and 2013, and the 2013 government appointments. In a complex, changing, and increasingly contested world, the Carnegie Endowment generates strategic ideas and independent analysis, supports diplomacy, and trains the next generation of international scholar-practitioners to help countries and institutions take on the most difficult global problems and safeguard peace. But to be fair, the Brotherhoods forced short tenure in power handicapped any such possible development. It was easy for the Brotherhood, while in opposition, to disseminate general principles that could garner public support on religious and cultural bases. The group failed to rise to the occasion and ended up failing both as conservative democrats and as Islamists. In the late 1930s the Brotherhood began to politicize its outlook, and, as an opponent of Egypts ruling Wafd party, during World War II it organized popular protests against the government. On January 30, 2013, the Nour Party proposed a compromise initiative to reconcile the conflicts between Morsis government and the opposition, but it was rejected by Brotherhood leaders, who saw it as a betrayal by a supposedly Islamist partner. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, it eschewed liberal values of pluralism, tolerance, and respect for individual freedoms in favor of theocratic intolerant notions of communal discipline and authoritative control. 
Third, Brotherhood leaders used Islamic concepts including sharia, the interest of Islam, the interest of the group, and religiously ordained necessity to religiously justify all decisions they made. The party became the political arm of the group. The Supreme Guide and the Guidance Office, whether in prison or exile, remain in charge of the organizations administration, although the Brotherhoods vertical command structure has been replaced by nonhierarchical networks and lines of communication. Overall, the Brotherhoods organizational mechanisms and bylaws were tightly controlled to ensure the survival of the groups parallel state. With the advent of the revolutionary regime in Egypt in 1952, the Brotherhood retreated underground. Facing regime repression, the Brothers sought refuge in their closed organization. It was therefore hard for the Brotherhood to stake out clear positions on the left-right political spectrum on a host of policy issues. Another issue of concern was the Brotherhoods concerted attempt to dominate the religious public sphere and its proselytizing. Ideology, which remained the Brotherhoods greatest motivator, collapsed when confronted with bureaucratic and economic realities. It was under their leadership that the Brotherhood rose out of the ashes after Nassers death, fixing a conservative, yet nonviolent, ideological path to which the organization still adheres. To trick counterfeiters, Benjamin Franklin deliberately misspelled Pennsylvania when printing official currency for the American colony. Fourth, the Brotherhood showed a lack of reflection. Hosni Mubaraks administration to restrict voting in the groups strongholds. If allowed to participate in elections, Islamists will gain a portion of the vote that will, at a minimum, include its sizable core constituency.33. Please select which sections you would like to print: Alternate titles: Society of the Muslim Brothers, al-Ikhwn al-Muslimn. Second, to isolate the Brotherhood, it has constructed a narrative attempting to link it to violent Islamism. Updates? The Brotherhood sought to defer the drafting of a new constitution until after parliamentary electionsa sequence that Brotherhood leaders believed could provide the group with legitimacy as a representative of both the people and the revolution. The 2011 and 2012 election results demonstrate that this strategy was somewhat successful. Nor did they provide them with adequate learning and training processes abroad. In addition to its political missteps and ideological deficiencies, the Brotherhoods unique structure also contributed to its ultimate downfall. Given the signs of organizational continuity, even renewal, Egypts political destiny will continue to be defined by the clash between the regime and Islamists. As far back as the early 2000s, some minor voices within the group started raising the idea that the Brotherhood in its original form had become obsolete as a result of its own success. The Muslim Brotherhoods demise was not simply a failure of its political party; it represented a failure of the organizations grand ideological project. The huge Islamist demonstration in Cairos Tahrir Square on July 29, 2011, which embraced slogans about Islamic identity and sharia, effectively negated the possible radicalization of street politics in the wake of the January 2011 uprising. To combat this, they concluded, Brotherhood members needed to develop additional skills through self-improvement. While Morsi was in power, the Brotherhood engaged other Islamists (including some of the most outspoken radical Salafists and jihadists) to build a solid base of support with which to counter rising anti-Islamist sentiment. Religion, including Islam, can be a major source of these ethics.17 The Brotherhood, however, pushed for its own interpretation of religious doctrine that did not treat all citizens equally and discriminated against the religious, doctrinal, and sectarian other. This should have been a wake-up call for the Brotherhood. 17 U.S. philosopher John Rawls, for instance, raised the concept of overlapping consensus. He suggested that a principled institutional foundation of a multicultural democracy can be sought in a strategic way when the followers of different totalistic normative doctrines in the same community (including religious, moral, cultural, and ideological systems of belief)which ostensibly advocate incoherent conceptions of justiceconform to specific principles of justice and concur on similar judgments of political correctness and its outcomes in the form of legislations and policies. They were also aware that other political groups and movements were instrumental in mobilizing demonstrators and writing the narrative of the uprising. The Muslim Brotherhood persevered during the period of repression by then president Gamal Abdel Nassers regime during the 1950s and 1960s, characterized by mass incarceration and torture strikingly similar to the present. It also maintained that it could consolidate its power through a series of international arrangements and domestic economic achievements based on a flexible combination of Islamist ideology, conservative culture, and economic liberalism. Personal relationships matter in the Muslim Brotherhood. Hassan al-Banna himself was assassinated shortly thereafter; many believe his death was at the behest of the government. This entailed a great deal of compromise on ideological and religious principles. Perhaps more significant than their impact on the fate of Islamism in Egypt, the three years following the 2011 revolution firmly invalidated the idea that Islamist movements, if included in a democratic system, will moderate and democratize. 22 Brotherhood leaders invoked religious verses obligating obedience to state leaders to justify their absolute unquestionable power over Brotherhood members. Throughout the post-Mubarak transitional period, the old state maintained its inherent traditional hostility toward Islamists. 2 In the months following Mubaraks ouster, the Brotherhood repeatedly confirmed its unwillingness to assume full responsibility over the country since it did not believe it could confront Mubaraks legacy of failure alone. A third reason for the Brotherhoods survival is that the diversification of its administrative processes has been supported by broadening communication networks. Such an arrangement could also have allowed the Brotherhood to escape the regimes crackdown that happened two years later. 21 The Brotherhoods organizational divisions were modeled on the Egyptian state structure, including governorates, cities, towns, and villages. Still, the Brotherhoods poor political performance was not just the result of a tactical mishandling of the sequence of events.
In addition to attempting to destroy the internal structures of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian regime has also taken its battle into the realm of ideas and ideology. Islamist movements will remain key political actors with an ideologically committed constituency and decades of accumulated social capital. 
