The experimental design illustrated in Figure 3 was planned to investigate whether (1) a history of cooperative or uncooperative interaction would affect aversion to inequity differently, whether (2) this influence depends on the order in which UI and CI conditions were presented, and whether (3) aversion to disadvantageous inequity is modulated by the information that points would be later exchanged for money. These data support the hypothesis that by interacting multiple times, participants have the possibility to learn about their partner's choices and modulate their behavior accordingly in future interactions, as suggested by Baker and Rachlin (2001). Hypothesis 2. Strategies and Tactics of Behavioral Research. Payoffs distributions between participants may vary in most social exchanges. Behav. Mak. E. Stat. I had so much it didn't seem fair: eight-year-olds reject two forms of inequity. Human punishment is motivated by both a desire for revenge and a desire for equality. The first screen presented a summary of the instructions (Figure 2A).
J. Exp.
doi: 10.1017/S0140525X05000129, Trives, R. L. (1971).
To simulate the participation of the other participant, a confederate remained in the experimental room throughout data collection, making some noises, such as dragging the chair and writing on paper when necessary.
The other 20 participants reverse order: UI, DI-Test, CI, and DI-Test. The other computer was placed on a table located directly behind the participant and confederate. Behavi.
doi: 10.1038/s41562-016-0042, Mithaug, D. E. (1969). Thus, the proportion of blue-card choices was used as a measure of DI aversion. Behav. In the present study, with the same experimental task across conditions, it was possible to evaluate whether the participants' choices were reciprocal to the confederate's choices or not. Quart. That is, CI will decrease, and UI will increase, aversion to DI during a subsequent DI-Test condition. 24, 116. The participants were undergraduate students in the following majors: civil and electrical engineering, physics, psychology, and administration. Results are also consistent with assertions by Brosnan (2011) about the relationship between cooperation and inequity aversion. (2017), for example, investigated the effects of a prior cooperative interaction on inequity aversion in dyads of children in India and Canada. Evol. Screens shown during the experimental session. During DI-Test conditions, Participants choices of blue cards allowed the computer to earn more points, and choices of green card prevented the computer from earning more points. Process. Psychol. Behav. Curr. Thus, reciprocity strategies may be also interpreted from the perspective of basic principles of learning considering the ways in which socially mediated reinforcement influences past, present, and future reciprocal behavior (Schmitt, 1998; Baker and Rachlin, 2001; Rachlin et al., 2001). With that, participants were able to receive 100 by choosing the blue card, in which case the computer received 20 points. doi: 10.1086/522809, Keywords: inequity aversion, reciprocity, cooperation, learning, points vs. money, Citation: Suarez CJ, Benvenuti MF, Couto KC, Siqueira JO, Abreu-Rodrigues J, Lionello-DeNolf KM and Sandaker I (2021) Reciprocity With Unequal Payoffs: Cooperative and Uncooperative Interactions Affect Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion. The dependent variable is the dichotomous nominal variable of the participants' choice of a blue or green card, with green as the reference category. 31, 5370. doi: 10.1901/jeab.1971.16-367, Schmitt, D. R., and Marwell, G. (1972). e Pesq. 15, 405412. To explain the ways in which cooperation can evolve among unrelated individuals, Trives (1971) proposed the notion of reciprocity. J. Exp. The learning experience may interact with all of these factors. Figure 2. Success-driven distribution of public goods promotes cooperation but preserves defection. (B) Depicts participants proportion of choices of blue card in each DI-Test, showing that prior interactions directly affected participants' choices in DI-Test conditions regardless of the order of exposition. An overhead depiction of the experimental setting, including the table and chairs disposition in the experimental room, as well as the position where the confederate, the participant and the experimenter remained throughout the experiment.
Forty-three university students (26 women and 17 men), 1829 years of age, participated in the experiment. We also asked whether information about the value of the outcomes (points alone or points exchangeable for money) would affect levels of inequity aversion during DI-Test conditions (hypothesis 2). CS, KC, MB, JA-R, IS, and KL-D wrote the manuscript. 41, 3252. (D) Presented a matrix of points corresponding to the new condition. 77:011904. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.77.011904, Rachlin, H. (2019). Estimated marginal means of participant's blue cards choices under disadvantageous inequity test conditions as a function of previews interactions with cooperative and uncooperative computer. We used the binomial distribution and logistics link function resulting in a repeated measure binary logistic regression model.
Retrieved from: https://www.eahb.org/2020-eahb-issue, Blake, P. R., and McAuliffe, K. (2011). Children and adolescents used cooperative strategies when playing with a cooperative confederate (Keil et al., 2017). Behav. Develop. Thereafter, participants responded to one of the sequences of the conditions (rectangle on the right). For example, children and adults cooperate more when playing with the same partner multiple times (e.g., Dal B, 2005; Dal B and Frchette, 2011; Blake et al., 2015b). Anal. Contingency-shaped and rule-governed behavior: instructional control of human loss avoidance. In reality, the participant interacted with a computer programed to make cooperative and uncooperative choices. One possible explanation for the inconsistency across studies is that the influence of the history of successful or unsuccessful cooperation in CI and UI exceeded the possible influence of points vs. monetary gains. doi: 10.1080/15021149.2010.11434337, Salgado, R. C., Canado, C. R. X., and Costa, C. E. (2011). The evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games: experimental evidence. Figure 2 shows all screens that were displayed during the experimental session. After interacting with a cooperative or uncooperative computer, participants chose between blue cards to produce larger gains to the computer and smaller for him/her or green cards to produce equal and smaller gains for both. Investigations of interactions between them may lead to a better understanding of the ways in which cooperation influences future interactions. A preliminar two-phase test of how inequity aversion is modulated by previous dyadic interactions. doi: 10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8. 11, 123138. These results contradict studies that have investigated whether the nature of earnings (points, money, candy, toys) affected participants' choices (Harbaugh et al., 2001; Blake and Rand, 2010; Salgado et al., 2011). Behav. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.04.006, PubMed Abstract | CrossRef Full Text | Google Scholar, Blake, P. R., McAuliffe, K., Corbit, J., Callaghan, T. C., Barry, O., Bowie, A., et al. Q. Rev. Econ. Behav. The computer was programmed to choose the blue card 12 times and to choose the green card four times at random. (2017), for example, children refused to receive more than others after a cooperative interaction. Therefore, aversion to inequity should be studied as another evolutionary process that occurs at the group level and over extended periods of time (i.e., altruism; Wilson and Wilson, 2007). J. Exp. A within-subjects design was employed to evaluate participants' proportion of blue-card choices after interacting with a cooperative and uncooperative computer (hypothesis 1). On the other hand, the literature on cooperation shows that it is strongly affected by reciprocal interactions (Silverstein et al., 1998; Baker and Rachlin, 2001). J. Exp. Behav.
47, 145158. In a prisoner's dilemma game, adults cooperated when the probability of reciprocity was high between the dyad (e.g., Silverstein et al., 1998; Baker and Rachlin, 2001). Opin. doi: 10.1038/s41562-017-0082, Szolnoki, A., and Perc, M. (2015). 8, 14. Why people prefer unequal societies. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0023223, Schmitt, D. R. (1998). Front. Competitive fixed interval performance in humans. J. Behav. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.84.037102, Perc, M., and Szolnoki, A. However, the post-hoc analysis showed no statistically significant difference in the proportion of blue-card choices when considering information about monetary outcome (F(1,1272) = 1.029, p = 0.295). 20, 154170. Experimental procedures, including instructions given to participants, were also approved by the ethics committee (CAAE protocol: 64336716.4.0000.5561). A. We discuss these results in the light of theories of reciprocal cooperation, inequity aversion, and conformity. For example, in the first trial, the experimenter said, Let us assume that Participant 1 chose the blue card and Participant 2 chose the green card. The participants were informed that they would perform the task as part of a dyad, but the choices were actually made by a computer program. You can check more than one alternative if necessary. J. Exp. (2006). Cooperation among unrelated individuals can evolve through reciprocity. Figure 1. (2013). Neurosci. JS carried out the statistical analysis. The Evolution of Cooperation. These and other results suggest that aversion to AI can be modulated by social interactions and cultural context, whereas DI is less sensitive to this (e.g., Adams, 1965; Ferh and Schmidt, 1999; Takagishi et al., 2010; Blake and McAuliffe, 2011; Blake et al., 2014, 2015a; McAuliffe et al., 2017; Li et al., 2018). 8, 443460. GARP for kids: on the development of rational choice behavior. Phys. A second post-hoc analysis was carried out to evaluate hypothesis 2 whether receiving information on the monetary outcomes would affect participants' reciprocity under DI-Test conditions. doi: 10.1016/j.jecp.2017.11.005, Warneken, F. (2016). Behav. The computer cursor was placed back in the middle of the screen at the start of each trial, ensuring that the participants actively made a new choice in every trial. Her hypothesis states that inequity aversion allows individuals to evaluate when they should (a) discontinue interactions with partners who continually accept advantageous inequity and, thus, benefit more in cooperative situations, (b) replace such unfair partners with partners who prefer equal distribution of gains, and (c) encourage future interactions with equitable partners and/or manage their reputation as a fair partner by refusing advantageous inequity. Any other combination resulted in 20 points for both. Studies that investigate how reciprocity may change due to learned mechanisms are important for understanding the variability and idiosyncrasies of participants' choices and their contextual modulation. Current Op. In the study by Corbit et al. (2011). Behav. If the participant did not explain why he/she chose the letter d, the experimenter asked what he/she thought and wrote it down on the paper. At the end of the session, a final screen showed the number of points gained in the previous condition as well as the total number of points obtained in the experiment. In Corbit et al. When the participant entered the room, the confederate was already seated in one of the chairs, as shown in Figure 1. Psic. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.02.002. Thus, a well-controlled experimental history of social interaction that involves different magnitudes of gains (i.e., more or fewer points for the participant in CI and UI interactions conditions affected the participants' choices under subsequent conditions, a result that is consistent with the literature on the effects of a history of reinforcement (and punishment) on non-social (e.g., Sidman, 1960; Galizio, 1979; Freeman and Lattal, 1992; Okouchi, 1999) and social (e.g., Mithaug, 1969; Buskit and Morgan, 1987; Spiga et al., 1992; Abreu-Rodrigues et al., 2002) situations. (2015a). Nonlin. Exp. 4:393. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00393, Shimoff, E., and Matthews, B.
Figure 4.
36, 323330. Children's collaboration induces fairness rather than generosity. Evol. The participant identification variable was modeled as a random effect. Anal. Overall, studies of inequity aversion have used tangible rewards as dependent variables for both humans and non-human participants. Cognition 120, 215224. To do so, we arranged experimental conditions in which the other participant (i.e., programed computer) worked cooperatively or uncooperatively in a situation that potentially produced greater gains for the participant (i.e., advantageous inequity for the participant). New York, NY: Basic Books, Axelrod, R., and Hamilton, W. D. (1981). (2017). We tested whether or not receiving information that earned points would be exchanged for money affected levels of aversion to inequity in a DI-Test in a between-subjects design (see Figure 3). The computer was programmed to choose the blue card on every trial. Stimulus control of behavioral history. Rev. Sci. Dec. Making 14, 5167. Our data show no significant difference between aversion to inequity and information about experiment outcome. Brain Sci. As reciprocity is known to have a strong effect on participants' choices to cooperate (e.g., Schmid et al., 2021), we investigated whether cooperative and uncooperative interactions involving reciprocity would affect aversion to DI. Econ. The participants were asked to click on the yellow circle to move to the next screen.
(A) Depicts participants aggregated data for proportion of blue choices, showing that computer choices prior to DI-Test directly affected participants' choices. 18, 8394. 2, 267299. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.08.003, Blake, P. R., and Rand, D. G. (2010). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. The experimenter showed one example of a matrix of points on the screen of the NFI and orally explained how to perform the experimental task (i.e., choose one of the cards and click on it). Flowchart of experimental design and conditions order of exposure. Ferh and Schmidt (1999) and Brosnan (2011) suggested that aversion to inequity and cooperation are intertwined processes, in which individuals discriminate when a partner received unfairly benefits from social exchanges and uses such information for future interactions. Studies of aversion to inequity often employ an unequal distribution of outcomes to perform a common task and examine an individual's refusal to accept unequal gains as the dependent variable (Ferh and Schmidt, 1999; Ahmed and Karlapalem, 2014; Brosnan and de Waal, 2014; Blake et al., 2015a). Rep. 5. Once the experiment is over, the following message will appear: Thank you very much for participating! Experimental sessions occurred at the University of So Paulo, So Paulo, Brazil. Anal. Ame. There were three payoff matrices that differed in terms of the distribution of points between the participant and the computer when the blue-blue combination occurred (see Table 1).
Individuals who cooperate for extended periods of time may manipulate payoff distributions, further effecting inequity either toward or away from a fair distribution. Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet, Oslo, Norway) funded the publication fee (Case no.:20/00125). The rationale for this design was to observe participants' choices in DI-Test conditions after interactions in which the computer was programmed to be cooperative or uncooperative with the participant. Hum. J. Exp. Behav. doi: 10.1257/000282805775014434, Dal B, P., and Frchette, G. R. (2011). Inequity aversion and the evolution of cooperation. (2019) argued that extreme payoff inequity prevents cooperation. Effects of inequity on human free-operant cooperative responding: a validation study. Hum. By that time, the confederate was waiting in the experimental room, sitting in the second chair. Anal. CS and MB conceived the study. 72, 205214. The blue-blue combination resulted in 100 points for the participant and 20 points for the computer. Children from both India and Canada exhibited aversion to AI after being exposed to the cooperative task but not to the individual task. 89, 17. (2007). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Rev. doi: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.09.008, Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Behne, T., and Moll, H. (2005). CS and KC drew the tables and the figures. Behav. Front. The second question was: In your opinion, why did the other participant choose the blue or green card? doi: 10.1126/science.1251776, Buskit, W., and Morgan, D. (1987). In each trial, you will receive a certain number of points. The post-hoc analysis revealed no significant difference between the proportion of blue-card choices when accounting for order of presentation of cooperative and uncooperative interactions. Estimated marginal means of participant's blue cards choices under disadvantageous inequity test conditions as a function of the information about monetary outcomes.
Q. Rev. J. Exp. Biol. One child in each dyad was selected to choose a green lever to accept the distribution or a red lever to refuse it. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080966, McAuliffe, K., Blake, P. R., Steinbeis, N., and Warneken, F. (2017). Unequal reinforcer magnitudes and relative preference for cooperation in the dyad. doi: 10.1126/science.1133755, Nowak, M. A., and Highfield, R. (2012). Participants played an experimental task in the presence of a confederate who acted as a second participant. [Epub ahead of print].
The studies involving human participants were reviewed and approved by Ethics committee of the University of So Paulo (CAAE protocol: 64336716.4.0000.5561). (2010). A GLMM omnibus test was used to assess hypothesis 1. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.06.012, Blake, P. R., Rand, D. G., Tingley, D., and Warneken, F. (2015b). This computer program was considered cooperative as choices favored participants earns. (2008). The second screen showed the matrix of points that were in effect for the current experimental condition (Figure 2B). 167, 336353. Thus, reciprocal cooperation and aversion to inequity can be complementary phenomena. Front. Cooperation: the roles of interpersonal value and gratitude. Copyright 2021 Suarez, Benvenuti, Couto, Siqueira, Abreu-Rodrigues, Lionello-DeNolf and Sandaker. In total, 40 participants met this criterion. Our data suggest that the same participant may be or may be not averse to disadvantageous inequity due to recent past cooperative history. We examined whether cooperative and uncooperative interaction between two individuals would influence participants' willingness to produce or refuse disadvantageous inequity. All of the participants signed an informed consent form that was approved by the ethics committee of the University of So Paulo. You can check more than one alternative if necessary. However, the computer was programmed to choose the green card on all trials. doi: 10.1038/nature15703, Blake, P. R., McAuliffe, K., and Warneken, F. (2014). To answer this question, the participant and the confederate had to choose one of the following alternatives: (a) To receive more points than the other participant; (b) It depended on the choice of the other participant; (c) To keep the same score between the two participants; (d) None of the previous alternatives (please, explain your answer). The developmental foundations of human fairness. At the end of each condition, a screen that showed the choices that were made by the participants and computer program and points that were received were displayed (Figure 2D). The elucidation of the connection between reciprocity and aversion to DI may represent a novel contribution to the understanding of the evolution of cooperation at large. Analy. New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group. Psic. J. Behav. You and your partner must choose between two cards (one blue and one green). Szolnoki and Perc (2015) argue that individuals may conform to others in order to select the most promising strategies for future interaction within the group. e Pesq. After the participants clicked on one of the chosen cards (i.e., blue or green), the points that were gained during the trials accumulated in a point counter that was located at the top left of the screen and the color combination of each trial displayed the card chosen by the participant and the computer program (Figure 2C). doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003, Ribes-Iesta, E., Rangel, N., Pulido, L., Valdez, U., Ramrez, E., Jimnez, C., et al. Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition. 105, 130137. Interface12:20141299. doi: 10.1098/rsif.2014.1299, Takagishi, H., Kameshima, S., Schug, J., Koizumi, M., and Yamagishi, T. (2010). The alternatives were: (a) To receive more points than me; (b) It depended on my choice; (c) To keep the score equal between you and him/her; (d) None of the previous alternatives (please, explain your answer). Reciprocity of responding as a determinant of a partial-altruistic behavior in humans. Anal. Adults' reciprocal responses in a puzzle game were modulated by confederates' percentage of cooperative plays (e.g., Ribes-Iesta et al., 2010; Avalos et al., 2015). The pizzagame: a virtual public goods game to assess cooperative behavior in children and adolescents. Matter Phsy. Anal. Child Psychol. (2021). In the present study, we could specify the reciprocal relationship that was established between the participants. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.89.022802, Avalos, L. P., Ribes-Iesta, E., Ortiz, I. L., and Serna, B. L. (2015). Phys. *Correspondence: Kalliu Carvalho Couto, kcouto@oslomet.no, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.628425, Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). Soc. doi: 10.1016/0022-0965(69)90117-9, Nowak, M. A. Probability of reciprocation in repeated prisioner's dilemma games. This experimental procedure was implemented with participants who were informed that points would be exchanged for money by the end of the experiment and participants who were not informed.
Science 314, 15601563. Lasting social interactions may also decrease aversion to unequal distribution of gains when individuals accept inequity payoffs knowing about the possibility of future encounters. 1, 17. doi: 10.5514/rmac.v41.i1.63688, Axelrod, R. (1984). J. Exp. After handing over the paper with instructions to the participant and the confederate, the experimenter asked them to put on the headset and start the experimental session. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(199806)11:2<123::AID-BDM283>3.0.CO;2-5, Smith, A., Pedersen, E. J., Forster, D. E., McCullough, M. E., and Lieberman, D. (2017).
Put on the headset that is lying on your desk and start the task.. Fairness expectations and altruistic sharing in 15-month-old human infants. Such studies may use candy or stickers to study aversion to inequity in children (Blake and McAuliffe, 2011; LoBue et al., 2011; Shaw and Olson, 2013; Blake et al., 2014; Corbit et al., 2017), money in studies with adults (Schmitt and Marwell, 1971a,b; Schmitt and Marwell, 1972; Shimoff and Matthews, 1975), and cucumbers and grapes in studies with monkeys (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003). Trives defined reciprocity as one individual providing helpful acts toward another individual who can provide benefits in return at a later time. doi: 10.1002/1099-0771(200101)14:<51::AID-BDM365>3.0.CO;2-K, Benvenuti, M. F. L., Siqueira, J. O., Suarez, C. J., Nascimento, C. A. V., Lionello-DeNolf, K. M., and Abreu-Rodrigues, J. In each trial, two sets of two virtual cards (blue and green) were displayed on the participant's computer screen. The shadow of the future promotes cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma for children. Avoidance of risk as a determinant of cooperation. 's (2017) study, different experimental tasks were used (a task prior to the situation of inequity and the Inequity Game). This study is not about intelligence or emotions. Ame. Two types of inequity aversion have been described in the literature: aversion to advantageous inequity (AI) and aversion to disadvantageous inequity (DI). Inequity in social exchange. 19. Aversion to inequity may be affected by the nature of outcomes. Behav. Instituto Nacional de Cincia e Tecnologia sobre Comportamento, Cognio e Ensino is supported by Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientfico e Tecnolgico (CNPq, Grant #465686/2014-1), Fundao de Amparo Pesquisa do Estado de So Paulo (FAPESP, Grant # 2014/50909-8), and by Coordenao de Aperfeioamento de Pessoal de Nvel Superior (CAPES, Grant #88887.136407/2017-00).