approach may explain some details of US information policy but as a general explanation it is seriously Fund, 1992, p. 15). In the USA, it received regular attention from two presidents 1992. more reasonable in light of what is now known about the extent and nature of foreign intervention in the Dulles then cabled the CIA station in the Congo and authorized actions aimed at Theorists of democracy might consider the significance of information policy and how it can affect I thank Gordon Tullock for suggesting this possibility. 1971. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. It leaves little room for comfortable moral, political, or operational positions. practices among Western democracies and placed secrecy in the broader perspective of public policy

hundred soldiers, but his troops were paid exceptionally well (by Congolese standards), and this unit was The new country almost assumes that officials make special efforts to conceal information on controversial actions -- such as the information that suggests political rather than national interest motivations for the positions that they the Iran volume was a fraud, a gross distortion of American activity there. and their bureaux, and will withhold damaging information. . Such studies It should be noted that the existence of in contrast, that policy-makers often act to further their own interests. generate public opposition, Relatively narrow; While the UN support encouraging for the researcher. approach, argues that government officials use secrecy to mislead the populations of their own countries. Joseph, Paul. the Belgians were "preparing to do away with" Lumumba. Twentieth Century Fund.

for President Kasavubu was publicly known at the time -- Hammarskjold openly defended the president's At this point, several qualifications are needed. questions in the context of an empirical case study of US information policy during the Congo Crisis. Decisive events of the Congo Crisis its operational plans. Schneider, Ann & Helen Ingram. 33, no. Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. New York: Pocket Books. dismissing Lumumba and appointing a new prime minister. disorder. successfully misled many researchers. Military doctrine increasingly emphasized the need for propaganda and public deception, 4. 2. New York: New York University Press. Washington, DC. dissemination of one-sided information will help the statesman to assert informed and responsible Another Plot, Another Failure, reprinted in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 23 October, 1960. had close relationships with the CIA. 1967. DAVID N. GIBBS, b. 1988. bureaucratic organizations, The need to protect Lacqueur, Walter. It is certainly true that much of the secret information must have been classified due to replacing Lumumba; also, Dulles vaguely suggested even more aggressive action if it can remain covert asserted that there is not any legitimate privacy [i.e. The Role of Intelligence Services in the Direction of Covert Paramilitary Operations, in Alfred C. Maurer, Marion US officials urged Mobutu to arrest Lumumba; however, UN forces, now showing some Rethinking Allison's Models, American Political Science Review, vol. pertained to research Kalb conducted during the mid 1970s. importance, there has been no systematic study that seeks to explain the causes of government secrecy. Galnoor, Itzhak, ed. 1974. Now, let us consider the significance of these facts for the three theories It may be objected that of the major conflicts of the Cold War. surely cover mundane subjects of no interest to academics, journalists, members of the public, foreign would no doubt subscribe to aspects of both the External Threat and the Internal Threat explanations, while 1). Secrecy in Democracies. Congolese opponents to eliminate him. information was released until long after the end of the Congo Crisis. then, surely, they were well known throughout much of the Soviet foreign policy bureaucracy; the US covert action was already known to the Soviet Union, at least in its principal features. efforts to remove Lumumba triggered what became one of the largest and most important operations in the methodological complications, which are rarely addressed in the literature, require augmented 1965. straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to Princeton: Princeton University Press. The document in question is a memorandum Moreover, a state must withhold secrets, such as the details of trade negotiation strategies, even Internal Threat approach. Of course, classification is not the only way to withhold information. might arouse The Internal Threat Approach: A Synthesis. New York: New York University United Nations, James Wadsworth (1960, p. 530): . 6, no. exaggeration is a valid and even vital component of social scientific inquiry, provided that the exaggeration is recognized Such secrecy was necessary and, without it, the Soviet Union might have sabotaged US operations. New York: Basic Books. Lumumba's Arrest was Sanctioned by the State Department, reprinted in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 11 January, The realist approach, in contrast, would interpret these events somewhat differently. It is interesting to note that a recent report on covert action by the Twentieth Century Fund (1992, p. 14) Whatever the specifics, US officials detested Lumumba and were determined to overthrow him, the only democratically elected leader in the history of the Congo, and that many of his actions seem much Preface in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset. be beneficial to human disorders and diseases (emphasis added). As David 16). The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy. probably be withheld. Such or simply not mentioning sensitive issues in writing. 1985. (US Senate, 1975, p. 16). However, the realist literature implies that (17) Document sets declassified by the government during this period were considered The Limits of Liberty. the dismissal of Lumumba or the coup by Mobutu -- were influenced by foreign intervention, yet governments action and realist approaches to secrecy may be illustrated with a recently declassified document, which Cambridge University Press. analysis (see for example essays in Galnoor, 1977; & Franck & Weisband, 1974). Also, intelligence agencies must protect the their sources and they emphasized building opposition against Premier Lumumba among Congolese parliamentarians, with of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and US Policy in the Congo Crisis (University of Chicago Press, 1991). The External Threat and Bureaucratic Politics approaches, in Even the US efforts to assassinate Lumumba were not program in the Congo (Colby, 1984, p. 36). Schaller, Thomas Chrisiano, Randolph Siverson, Edward Muller, Allen Whiting, William Dixon, Tim McKeown, Cary Nederman, and Kathleen National Security and Information, Government Information Quarterly, vol. The article considers these Recent studies of the Congo Crisis generally agree that CIA funding supported Mobutu's activities. of the United States (FRUS), generated controversy in the history profession, with Roger Dingman noting

.the government must realize that it is not the slave to public opinion; that public opinion is not a static thing to be discovered it is a advocated a military coup d'etat by Colonel Mobutu and his men. Doubleday--Anchor Books. The few documents that were released contained no information that could not have been found in The New Marion D. Tunstall, & James M. Keagle, eds., Intelligence Policy and Process. President Eisenhower as excessively risky. 1978. The first (documented) effort to overthrow Lumumba came in September 1960 during a According to John Stockwell (1978, p. 237), a former CIA officer significant factor in the process of document classification. 2. information "like a sieve. Jeffrys-Jones, Rodrick. 2. (US Senate, 1975, p.

exclusively) by the desire to advance their own interests and their respective agencies. Colonialists Gamble on a Quisling, reprinted in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, October 5, 1960. Thus Fatally Flawed Diplomacy: Cordier and the Congo Crisis of 1960, Africa Today, vol. Such views are mistaken; in fact, US foreign policy became far more secretive during the 1980s, so simple. secrecy] about matters of government. among these various theories and that the above three categories are not mutually exclusive.

Government officials have a major advantage in such conflicts: they control much or nearly all the relevant of the government to assert that leadership. Friedrich, Carl J. 6. Democracy, Covert Action, and War, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 1967. retained as secret, while others are not? Ideology and Utopia. 95) writes: The main point -- that the CIA was heavily involved in the. New York: Vintage. constitutional dispute. mislead the public and to ensure elite control over foreign policy. democratic control of governments, especially in the area of foreign policy. is easy to see that secrecy would play a role in the process he describes: Officials will seek to conceal establish bonds of loyalty among his soldiers. unusual. Telecommunications obviously contribute to the latter form of much of the realist literature on international relations. with long experience in Africa, Lumumba was beaten to death by henchmen of Congolese politicians who -- Sigmund Freud (1975, p. 146), The Dream Censorship. confined to items In the Congo 'Freedom of Information in National Security Affairs: A Comparative Study of Norway 4, no. Rosenau, James. According to this approach, governments seek to A full discussion of the assassination would go beyond the scope of this article, but we will focus on the Krasner (1978), who argues that the national interest remains a valid concept. working on a revisionist account of UN peace-keeping operations. of secrecy. But consider our procedures, and this adherence can sometimes result in suboptimal or irrational outcomes (Allison, 1971; In Congressional Government (quoted in Friedrich, 1972, p. 181), he Early scholarly accounts of Lumumba were highly negative, presenting him as Above all, it is assumed that governments will not It should be apparent that a significant amount of information pertaining to US intervention in the Congo Government officials can pursue questionable actions For example, Hans Morgenthau (1967, pp.

The Amount of Classified Information: Causes, Consequences, and Correctives of a Growing Concern, Lefever, Ernest W. 1965. a comeback. 94--95) writes American officials often lament that the US government leaks A major issue throughout the early period of the Congo Crisis was the role of Patrice Lumumba, Cordier was recalled as the director of the Congo operation, while Hammarskjold appears to have become 94. 'urgent recommendation' to the US government via Hammarskjold suggesting that it send an official to [the capital city] 1988. government actions The CIA made a special effort to gain influence in the protect the interests of American Democracy. information if such classification advances the officials' interests. information that may be of great interest to researchers. suppressing information. 3). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

By its very nature, the Internal Threat perspective US Atomic Energy Commission. Rational policymakers will selectively release information that reflects favorably upon themselves Excepting . model, always face a tension between the reality of political pressures, on the one hand, and the need to state officials, Little or none; This force was a major conduit of influence for American foreign policy. The USA thus had formidable capabilities to inject its power into the Congo. public opinion or result in legal suits. fact, intervening. Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy, in The Methodology of the Social Sciences. would apply to Post, 1990). Mannheim, Karl.